QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
PROCESSES: SOME PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL
APPLICATIONS
S. SIDNEY ULMER*
INTRODUCTION

In spite of those who dismiss a "science of politics" as an absurdity,1 the most
cursory survey of political research over the last decade reveals changes in focus,
orientation, and investigative technique of imposing magnitude. The most impressive measure of these "new forces" is the extent to which the concepts, vocabulary,
and methods of the behavioral sciences have crept into the writings of those least
sympathetic to such change. And the judicial processes, which some consider least
suitable for behavioral analysis, have not been spared 2 Yet, the bench and the bar
seem either blissfully unaware of-or if aware, not sufficiently impressed to utilizethe behavioral orientation or the analytical methods associated with that perspective.
The paucity of behavioral and quantitative analyses in the law journals, and other
publications of legal scholars, is evidence for such a view. For a profession in the
throes of a "crisis of confidence"3 in its traditional methods of understanding and
predicting the "working out" of judicial processes, the stovepipe view would seem
a luxury of prohibitive dimensions.
It is not as if all students of the law have been insensitive to judicial behavior as
a response to environmental stimuli. But without Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank,
the voices of the legal realists seem quieter now. While some members of the
fraternity have occasionally evidenced an appreciation of quantitative techniques in
analyzing factual data, most continue to rely on stare decisis and rule analysis,
combined from time to time with insights and revelations derived from amateur,
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at-a-distance psychoanalysis, personal friendships, and other equally unique-to-theanalyst sources
In this paper, we propose to suggest some uses of quantitative methods5 and
probability theory6 in analyzing judicial materials. This, we shall do by considering
two kinds of relationships: first, the relation of judicial decision making to predecision situation factors; and second, the relationship between the validity or
correctness of collegial decision making and the number of decision makers involved. While the latter is theoretical, the former concerns, inter alia, the practical
matter of predicting court decisions.
I
PREDICTING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

In predicting judicial behavior, it is well to recognize at the outset that time, place,
and circumstance are crucial; that the variables are many and not always subject to
control. But these are not insuperable obstacles. And, of course, quantitative
methods are not suggested as alternatives to proven methods of legal analysis that
are performing well the function for which they were designed. Llewellyn has
pointed out that traditional legal analysis suffers from an excessive focus on legal
rules In comparing pre- and postwar periods, he remarks that "no longer is the
established bar convinced that laws and not judges are doing the deciding of cases.
No longer is certainty in the outcome of appellate cases an ideal too sacred for
'A recent example of a nonquantitative and nonreplicable predictive technique can be found in
Fred Rodell's discussion of Baker v. Carr, For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing,
5o GEo. L. J. 70o (1962). Apparently believing that judicial votes are more accurately predictable in
terms of the personal predilections of the judges than on the basis of impersonal, or objective, reasoned
rules, Rodell predicted a 5-4 Supreme Court vote in Baker v. Carr eleven days before the Supreme
Court dccision. Moreover, he identified the Justices he expected to find on each side and predicted
that the Court would "order the requested redistricting." Id. at 707. While the Court took action
likely to promote redistricting, it did not "order redistricting," as Justice Stewart makes clear in his
concurring opinion. Rodell correctly predicted seven of the eight votes cast-an impressive result
indeed. But in a larger perspective, it may be meaningless. For who knows how Rodell reached his
result? Can any lawyer replicate Rodell's experiment and results? The important question is not
whether one can predict judicial votes in one case by intuition or sheer guess, or through personal
contact with judges or their clerks, but what replicable procedures are significantly successful over a
long run of cases. If Rodell has discovered any successful predictive device based on "human factors,"
he has yet to make it available to the profession at large.
'Materials on quantitative methods in the social sciences are abundant. Especially useful are
J. P. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION (x956), and SIDNEY SIEGEL,
For a more philosophical treatment
NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEsAvsORAL SCIENCES (1956).
see LEoN FESTINGER & DANIEL KArz (EDs.), RESEARCH METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (r953).
A widely used compendium of articles dealing with the methodology of social research is PAUL
LAZARSFELD & MORRIS ROSENBERG (EDs.), THE LANGUAGE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (1955).
' Chapters on probability theory can be found in most textbooks in statistics. A classical statement
is PIERRE SIMION, MARQUIS DE LA PLACE, A PmsiosomcAL EssAY ON PROBARBiLsEs (translated from the
French by F. W. Truscott & F. L. Emory, 195). A good introduction to this subject is HAROLD
CRAMER, THE ELEMENTS OF PROBABILITY THEORY (1955).

'See Karl N. Llewellyn's works generally, but particularly his JURISPRUDENCE (1962). On page
357 of that work, he declares: "The rule part of the law-institution is thus one tool-part of the
institution; one hugely developed part; one part vital to communication over space and time and variant
personnel; but one vital tool-part and no more than that, and a tool-part nowhere nearly so effective
as it purports to be." The quotations that follow are taken from KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITIoN-DECIDING APPEALS 15 (196o).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

binoculars." The tenor of the times he thinks reflected in such statements as "you
never can tell on what peg an appellate court will hang its hat" or "the Supreme
Court is going to hell" or "what has become of the doctrine of precedent." The need
for improvement seems as obvious as it seems possible of attainment.
Any social scientist making a study of judicial processes for the first time would
no doubt be struck by the great quantities of relevant data systematically recorded
and accessible to one who wishes to use it. This is not always true in social science
research, and it offers some clear-cut opportunities. For it is well known that some
forms of data, when collected in sufficient quantities, will reveal certain patterns or
regularities. These regularities have analytical value. Once observed, they may be
projected into the future in a predictive fashion. The lawyer, like everyone else,
proceeds in this fashion. But if stare decisis is his guiding principle, he may base
his prediction on one or a few cases in which decision went his way. It is beyond
dispute at this point in time that with such an approach, precedent can be found for
almost any point of view, either directly or by analogy. It is possible that a focus on
regularized patterns of data or behavior provides a safer predictive route. That, in
essence, is one thesis of this paper.
One may ask, of course, whether there are regularities in the great mass of
decisions and related processes to which each day adds voluminously. Most social
science research designed to answer that question has dealt with the United States
Supreme Court or with state supreme courts. That research has established that
judges exhibit consistent patterns of behavior in relating to each other, in respect
to the particular class of litigant before the court, and in responding to subject
matter. Thus, judges on collegial courts often coalesce in highly stable blocs or
cliques. It is now well established that certain litigants are more successful than
others before the United States Supreme Court In the 1958 term of that Court,
the federal government won seventy-five per cent of the opinion cases in which it
participated. This compares with a success rate of sixty-two per cent for labor
organizations, fifty-three per cent for state and local governments, and twenty-two
per cent for corporations and other business enterprises. Moreover, the responses
of the Court to certain litigant classes have been consistent over time. The federal
government has, since i92i, been favored in cases involving amendments to the
federal constitution. 9 On the basis of data drawn from Supreme Court cases
involving ten federal administrative agencies in the 1947-1956 terms, it was established that the Court favored federal agencies more frequently than it opposed
I PRITCHETT, op. cit. supra note 2; GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
(i96o); Snyder, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 38 SOCIAL FORCE 232 (1958); Ulmer,
The Inalysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court, 22 J. POLITICS 629 (x96o),
and cf. Ulmer, Homeostatic Tendencies in the United States Supreme Court, in S. SIDNEY ULNfER (ED.),
INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 167 (196).
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TABLE I
VOTING PATTERNS IN SUPREME COURT CASES INVOLVING ALIENS, COMMUNISTS, AND
NEGROES-BY JuSTICES, i955-z96o*
AC

CC

Justice

+

Douglas ...............

37

36

Warren ................
Brennan ...............
Frankfurter ............
Harlan ................
Whittaker ..............
Stewart ................
Burton ................
Clark ..................
Minton ................

32
24
19
13
7
1
10
6
2

6
10
19
24
20
8
19
32
2

Reed ..................

87%
70%
50%
35%
26%
11%
34%
16%
50%

3

4

43%

Black ..................

%+

+

1

94%

2

97%

47

-

NC

%+

+

-

%

0

100%

0

25

100%

3

24

89%

4

87%

43
27
34
25
7
2
14
16
7

3
1
13
16
13
1
26
30
11

93%
96%
72%
60%
35%
67%
35%
34%
39%

25
20
19
18
17
9
7
18
2

3
4
9
10
6
4
7
10
2

5

89%
83%
67%
64%
74%
69%
50%
64%
50%

14

25%

2

3

40%

47

-

Legend: AC-Alien cae
CC-Communist cases.
NC-Nero cases.
+--decision for alien, communist or Negro.
--- decision against alien, communist or Negro.
Alleged communists and communist sympathizers are included in the "Communist" classifcation.

them to a statistically significant degree. n Labor organizations have also fared
quite well in amendment cases since 1935." At the same time, corporations have
had a relatively low litigant status before the Court. 3
If we consider individual Justices, several additional observations may be made.
Voting records of some Justices are highly skewed in one direction or another in cases
involving certain kinds of litigants. A study of thirty-eight cases involving aliens,
forty-seven cases involving communists or alleged subversives, and twenty-eight cases
involving Negroes in the period I955-196o tellingly illustrates this point. Votes of
the Justices for and against aliens, communists, and Negroes have been compiled
and are presented in table one. The figures show that the Justices usually identified
as "liberals" have supported claims in communist cases at a rate running from
ninety-three to ioo per cent. Other Justices show rates varying from eleven to
seventy-four per cent. While the votes of the Justices in communist cases may not
be evidence for a tenderizing of the judicial mind toward the Communist Party, tho
discrepancies in the patterns are such that research designed to investigate such a
possibility would not be discouraged. On the basis of what we already know concerning Warren, Douglas, Black, and Brennan, two hypotheses may be suggested.
We may hypothesize first that for any category, the liberals favored the claim of the
individual more frequently than they opposed it to a statistically significant degree.
We may further hypothesize that the remaining Justices opposed the claim in any
given category more frequently than they supported it to a statistically significant
degree.
' "Tannhaus, stepa note 9.
'2Snyder, supra note 2.
's Ibid.
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To test the propositions suggested, associated probabilities were computed for each
Justice in each category. These are presented in table two. The tables suggest a
preference of the liberal Justices for oppressed individuals before the Court, since
the deviation of each Justice's voting pattern from the breakdown expected by
chance is statistically significant in all categories. On the other hand, four Justices
had configurations consistent with those expected; three had expected patterns in
two of the three categories; one had an expected pattern in one of the categories. Thus, our first hypothesis is confirmed for Warren, Douglas, Black, and
Brennan in all cases; the same relationship is confirmed for Frankfurter in communist
cases and for Whittaker in Negro cases. The second hypothesis is confirmed for
three Justices-Whittaker, Stewart, and Clark-but only in alien cases. It would appear, then, that only certain of the relationships examined would warrant further
intensive analysis. But the evidence examined suggests that alien, communist, or
Negro status was a circumstance responsible in varying degrees for the consistent
voting behavior of certain Justices in the cases examined.
Regularized response to subject matter is observed at both state and federal
levels. For example, there is evidence for the view that democratic judges are more
likely to vote for the workmen in workmen's compensation cases, 4 for the plaintiff
in negligence suits,15 for the unemployed in unemployment compensation cases,16
and for defendants in criminal cases 1 In the United States Supreme Court, it is
TABLE II
AssociATn PROBABILITIES*

FOR VOTING PATTERNS IN SUPREME COURT CASES

INVOLvING ALIENS, COMMUNISTS, AND NEGROES-BY JUSTICES,

Justice

D

Alien
Cases

D

Com.
Cases

Douglas
.................
Black....................

+
+

P<
.00
P<.01

P<
.001
P<.001

Warren ..................
Brennan .................

+
+

P<.001
P<.03

+
+
+
+

P<.001
P<.001

+

P<.003
-

Frankfurter..............Whittaker.................Stewart..................
Clark ....................
Harlan ..................Burton ..................Minton ..................Reed ....................-

P<.03
P<.05
P< 00

-

-

Negro
Cases

N

++

P
< .001
P<.001

38
38

+
+

P<.001
P<.003

37
29

P<.05
.-

47
23

D

+
-

-

..

-

-

1955-196o

-

-

-

-

9
38

--

--

*Unless
otherwiseindicated, all probability statistics used in this paper are two-Wiled and were computed with the binomial expansion
if N was smalland with the binomial test and the Yates correction for continuity for N largo. The formula for the binomial expansion Is
P(x) =

N

P-Qs" where P=proportion of cases expected in one category. Q= -P and

G)

(iX!/

NI

xl(N-x)I

For large samples (N>25)

Z=(x± .5)-NP.

VNPQ

Legend: - D=direction of the relationship; N- approximate mean cases.
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"' Nagel, Political Party 4fliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am.POL. Sci. Rev. 843 (1961).
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well known that the responses of individual Justices go consistently in one direction

or the other in certain subject matter areas. For example, in fifty-nine Fair Labor
Standards Act cases decided in the period 1941-1959, Justice Black voted pro-labor
fifty-five times as compared to thirty-two pro-labor votes cast by Frankfurter. In
sixty Federal Employers Liability Act cases decided in the 1938-1958 terms, Black and
Douglas voted for the worker fifty-nine times. And, in nineteen Sherman Act
monopoly cases, decided in the ten years 1949-1959, Black found a violation of the
law in every instance1
Impressive evidence of consistent response to subject matter is to be found in the
voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices in cases posing civil liberty questions.
The current rank order of the Justices in terms of favorableness toward civil liberty
claims can be portrayed in a voting chart such as table three. 9 The Justices are
ranked from most favorable (Douglas and Warren) to least favorable (Clark).
The structure portrayed probably coincides with prevailing impressions regarding
the relative attitudes of liberals and conservatives on the Court. But given the fact
that civil liberty cases involve a number of different fact situations, constitutional
and statutory provisions, and legal rules, and that change in respect to one or all
may occur from year to year, we may not expect the same structure to exist for very
long. Yet, when voting tables are compiled in the same way for a period of years,
the stability in the rank orders is remarkable. The author has compiled and compared such tables for seven Supreme Court terms (1955-1961) 20 Taking each
successive pair of terms, the similarity in the rank orders for each pair would be
expected by chance much less than one time in one hundred. And taking all seven
terms collectively, the stability of the total rank order pattern would be expected
by chance less than one time in one thousand. From this and related evidence we
"' These figures are from WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN
THE COURT 21-22, 24 (1961).
'Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S.350 (1962); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57 (g6i); Fong
Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141 (1962); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962); Beck v.
Washington, 369 U. S. 541 (1962); Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 66o (1962); Manual Enterprises
v. Day, 370 U. S. 478 (1962); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S.
421 (1962); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 (ig6s); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154 (x962); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. x86 (1962); Rusk v. Cort, 369
U. S. 367 (z962); Scholle v. Hare, 369 U. S. 429 (1962); Lanza v. People of the State of New York,
370 U. S. 139 (1962); Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U. S. 599 (1962); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U, S. 49 (1962); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448 (ig6i); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U. S. 443
(196!); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 5o6 (1962); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (196r); In re
Green, 369 U. S.689 (i962); Killian v. United States, 368 U. S. 231 (196i); Silber v. United States,
370 U. S. 717 (1962); Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749 (1962); Cramp v. Board of Public
Instruction of Orange County, Florida, 368 U. S. 278 (I961); Grumman v. United States, 370 U. S.
288 (1962). This list includes all civil liberty cases decided by the Court in the 1961 term. Table III
portrays only five ranks, i.e., (DO,BL,WA); (BR); (ST); (HA); (CL) in that order. No significance
can be attached to remaining positions of Justice as a result of low participation rates.
"For the 1956 and 1957 scales, see Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights, 13 WEMsRN
POL. Q. 288 (196o); the x958 scale is in Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United
States Supreme Court, 22 J. PoLisCS 629 (i96o); civil liberty cases for the 1959 term are scaled in
Ulmer, Scaling ludicial Cases: A Methodological Note, 4 Ams. BEHAvioAL Scirxmzsr 31 (1961); a scale
of the 196o cases is included in Ulmer, A Note on Attitudinal Consistency in the United States Supreme
Court, 22 INDIAN J. POL. SC. 195 (i96i).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

TABLE III
SCALOGRAM: NON-UNANIMOUS CIVIL

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,

FR

WE

CL

I-

-

-

+

n
n

+
n

+
+

+
+

+
+

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

n
n

n
n

-

+

+

+

-

n

n

-

5-2

+

+

+

-

n

n

-

5-2

+

+

+

-

n

n

-

+
+
+

-

-

-

n

-

-

-

-

n
n

n

n

5

BR

Scholle ................
Engel ................. +
+
Robinson ..............
Fong .................. +
+
Manual ...............
Lynch ............... +

±
+

+
+

+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+

+

+

+

Russell ................

+

+

Silber .................

+

+
+

Baker .................. +

++

Wood .................

+
+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+

+

+
Rusk ................. +
Gallegos ................ +
Killian ................ +
Hutcheson .............

+
+
+

Pa ....................

17

Oyler .................
Beck ..................

F

[
17

16

-

-

-

17

17

17

1

1

-

Ineon ...........
Code:

+ decision for civil liberty claim
- decision a.sinst civil liberty claim
A total participations
Ineon. inconsistent votes
DO Douglas
HA Harlma
WA Warren
FR Frankfurter
BL Black
WE White
BR Brennan
CL Clark
'ST Stewart
WH Whittaker

Vote

HA

BL

Grummma .............

WH

ST

WA

DO

LIBERTY DECIsIoNS,
i96I-z962 TERM

7-1
6-1
n

6-2
7-1
0-1

6-1
5-2

+

n

-

n

-

n

-

n

-

2

17

2

-

-2
5-2
5-3
4-3
4-5
4-5
3-4.
2-4

127

1

CR= .977
CS=.834

infer that Supreme Court Justices are responding in civil liberty cases in terms
of attitude toward deprivation of liberty, that such attitudinal responses are sufficiently consistent in a given term to form a rank order continuum from most
favorable to least favorable toward civil liberty claims, and that such attitudinal
structures are highly stable over time.
Stable patterns of behavior are precisely those factors which make prediction
possible. Our research to date suggests that even though judicial behavior may be
in part a function of attitude rather than "law" in the narrow sense, it may still
be highly predictable since mature judges do not change attitudes, habits, perspectives,
or values with each setting sun. Once it is discovered how a particular judge or
court responds in certain kinds of situations and that such responses are regularized,
we may anticipate a continuation of the same behavior patterns. The next step is
to relate regularized response to decisional outcome in such a way as to make prediction of such outcome possible.
If judges tend to respond consistently to each other, to litigant types, and to
subject matter, it is not unreasonable to ask whether they also respond consistently
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to other pre-decision factors in the cases they decide. Indeed, the law requires
that they do so in the cardinal rule that similarly situated litigants are to be equally
treated. As applied in a specific subject matter area, we expect cases decided for
defendants to differ from cases decided against defendants. Of course, such differences may involve procedural factors, legal rules, considerations of justice, and
so on. But cases are often distinguished on the facts, and it is to be anticipated that
on balance, differences in configurations of fact will be observed, and will often be
determinative of decisional outcome. In some instances, the presence or absence of
a single primary fact may be sufficient to determine decision. In responding to
cases involving the exclusion of Negroes from state juries, the United States Supreme
Court has been highly sensitive to a single numerical fact-namely the ratio of
Negroes to whites in the community from which the jury is drawn.21 But in many
cases, courts are responding to total factual situations and differences therein. And
the importance of any one fact in a situation may depend, inter alia, on the other
facts with which it is associated.
Fred Kort has suggested that this is true in cases involving workmen's compensation, involuntary confessions, the right to counsel, and unreasonable searches and
seizures. In 1957 and again in i96x, Kort devised methods of separating, on the
facts, cases decided for (pro) and against (con) defendants. The earlier method
was applied to right-to-counsel cases in Kort's PredictingSupreme Court Decisions

Mathematically. But dissatisfaction with the technique led to refinements in
1961-modifications involving factor and regression analyses.23 As a consequence,
the x961 method is more complex than the earlier one, thereby reducing, perhaps,
the utility of the approach for the practicing lawyer if not for the legal scholar.
The 1961 method has been applied, however, to cases concerning right to counsel,
workmen's compensation, and involuntary confessions. Glendon Schubert utilized
Kort's earlier method (with minor modifications) in separating pro and con cases
in the search-and-seizure area in the period 1937-1957. Schubert's work suggests that

in federal cases, but not in state cases, the pro and con cases can be separated on
the facts.2 4 In general, the work to date does not suggest that Kort's contentions

concerning the predictive utility of such an approach are entirely without merit.
It would seem, however, that certain refinements in method will have to be made
before the issue will be widely tested. As yet, we have no agreed upon answers to
the following questions:
"Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases, 1935-z96o, 56 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 325

(1962).
22 51 Amr. PoL. Se. RFv. 1 (1957).
" See Kort, "Quantitative Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions" (mimeo. x96o). A revised
version of this paper may be found in GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKeING (1963).
A critique of the earlier Kort methods is Fisher, The Mathenatical Analysis of Supreme
Court Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods, 52 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 321 (1958).
A reply is Kort, A Reply to Fisher's Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions, 52 Am. Pot.
S-i. REV. 339 (x958). A related commentary on predictive devices is Nagel, Using Simple Calculations
to Predict Judicial Decisions, 4 Am. BEHAvORAL SCIENTIST 24 (ig6o).
"GLENDON

A. ScmmERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 338-70 (960).

172

.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

•

I)of all facts that might be identified in a particular case, which facts are to be
identified as relevant;
2) of all relevant facts, how many should be used in the analysis;
3) having determined the number of facts to be used, how is the selection to be
made.
Some related questions along the same line have been raised and discussed by
Frederick Bernays Wiener in the November 1962 issue of the American Bar
Association Journal. Wiener is particularly distressed by the "computer people's"
listing of 45 facts "'that have been determinative of past decisions of the United
States Supreme Court on the merits in right to counsel cases.'" Specifically, he
asserts that to suggest Alabama origin as "having any weight whatever" in such
cases is "the sleaziest kind of ad hominem dig.' 20 But of course such emotion-laden
comments are completely irrelevant. Whether a fact, such as Alabama origin, has
influence on decision making is an empirical question. It matters little whether
one is repelled by the suggestion. The material query is: Does the observation
and analysis of such facts enable or contribute to correct prediction of outcomes?
Wiener's evaluation of mathematical and computer techniques of prediction as
"learned nonsense" is patently premature and probably false.
To return to our first question, the work to date suggests that the facts to be
identified are those promoting a pro-decision (Kort and Nagel make this suggestion).
But it is not yet clear that the results of such selective processes are replicable"2
A possible answer to question No. 2 might be framed in terms of research purpose.
While Kort has used twenty-six, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, and nineteen
fact variables in his analyses, and Schubert has used twenty facts in his search and
seizure research, it has not been determined in any of these situations whether and to
what extent predictive ability would be impaired or enhanced by a reduction or expansion in the number of variables used in a particular analysis3 7 If the test of a
predictive device is successful prediction, then the number of variables may not be
crucial but each increase in the number of facts to be analyzed increases the complexity of analysis in a manner more akin to geometric than to arithmetic progression.
This alone is sufficient reason for reducing the number of variables used if we can do
so without impairing predictive ability beyond a permissible pointF Moreover, we
might be willing to make small sacrifices in predictive ability in order to gain
significant advantages in ease of computation. In respect to the third question, trial
and error seems necessary to determine what particular set of fact variables will best
promote successful prediction 9
"Wiener, Decdson Prediction by Computers: Nonsense Cubed and Worse, 48 A.B.A.J. 1023, 1026,
1027 (x96i).

The use of a "panel" to select the facts might improve replicability.
Kort analyzes involuntary confession cases with 21 and 22 variables.
I ort's reduction of the number of variables to a smaller number of factors through formal factor
X
analysii is (x) involved, and (2) will not necessarily improve predictive ability.
Thus, while the use of simultaneous equations will enable one to find the "best" weights for the
variables in a least squares sense, no satisfactory method for determining the "best" set of variables
for prediction has been presented.
' Although
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In line with these thoughts, a method that differs somewhat from those previously
introduced may be used to illustrate the general approach to the mathematical prediction of court decisions. What is needed is a relatively simple device for ascertaining
the weights to assign to a series of variables in order to get a maximum separation in
two groups. The discriminant function is appropriate for such a purpose?0 The
equation is expressed as
D = Al x- + A2 x2 + A3 X3 + A 4 x 4 ... + Am xm where xi x2 etc. are numerical variables and Al A2, A3 etc. are the co-efficients.
The co-efficients can be found by the following simultaneous equations:
Nzdl = A1 , x 2i + A 2 Z xi x2 + A3 I xi xs + Ai x 4+....
Nzd2 = A1 I xi x2 + A 2 E x22 + A3 1 2xs3 + A 4 T x2 x4 +
Nzd3 = Al I Xx3 + A2
Nzd 4 = Ai 1 X1 X4 + A 2

x2 xa + A3 11x 2 s + A 4

,

xax4 +,...

xx4 + A3 M xs x4 + A 4 2 x24 + ....
x

In the equations, N is the total number of cases, z is the height of the ordinate

associated with a division of a variable into p and q parts, and the d's are the
differences in the means of the numerically expressed variables in the dichotomy.
Solution of the equations furnishes a weight for each variable in the operative set.
A summation of the weights associated with the fact variables in a particular judicial
case gives a numerical criterion. When applied to all cases in a set, a maximum
separation between pro and con cases may be obtained. The author has found this
technique to give promising results in several areas.3 ' In one case, for example,
the technique was applied to nineteen search-and-seizure cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court in the period I942-i962

The nineteen cases have the fol-

lowing common characteristics: all are federal cases, and all are cases in which an
actual search occurred without a search warrant. Thus, the question of the "reasonableness" of the search in the total factual circumstances is importantly present in
each case. From these nineteen cases a total of twenty facts considered relevant to
decision were identified.3 3 And from these, the following four fact variables- were
selected for the analysis:
"The use of the discriminant equation for this purpose was suggested by Fisher, supra note 23.
Namely, cases involving right to counsel, citizenship, double jeopardy, workmen's compensation,
and search and seizure.
"Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942); Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (946);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 (1948); Harris
v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947); United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 58r (1948); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U- . 45 (1948); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. x6o (1949); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (195o); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (ig5i); On Lee v. United States,
343 U. S. 747 (1952); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480 (r958); Jones v. United States, 357
U. S. 493 (1958); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959); Miller v. United States, 357 U. S.
301 (%958); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217
(196o); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 5o5 (196i); Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 6xo
(196r).
"Application of Nagel's correlational analysis to these 20 facts in the x9 cases gave a perfect
separation of pro and con cases. Thus, a hypothesis that the 2o variables are independent of each other
cannot be rejected. The general question is whether and to what extent fact-variables in a series of
cases are independent or interdependent. The answer has not been furnished by research to date.
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(i) the search was a search of living quarters;
(2) the search was made in the absence of an arrest warrant;
(3) the search involved participation of state officers;
(4) the search occurred after forcible entry or trespass.
The research question posed is whether various combinations of these four facts
would differentiate pro and con cases in our nineteen case sample. In computing
a discriminant equation, it is necessary to score the facts, as they appear in each case,
as an initial estimate of their weights. From these initial estimates the discriminant
equation will give the operating weights that lead to a maximum separation of the
cases involved.
The best way initially to score the cases has not been determined. Several possibilities suggest themselves. First, each fact identified in the case could be weighted
initially by the number of pro votes present in the case. A second possibility is to
score a facts presence in a case by its probability of appearance in a pro decision. A
third method, and the one used here on a purely experimental basis, is to score the
facts in terms of their correlation with decision for the defendant. The use of raw
case votes was eschewed in the present work because the use of case votes in regression analysis does not, at this stage, appear too promising. The second method requires a larger aggregate of data than that with which we are dealing. Scoring our
four facts as indicated and solving the equations presented on page 173, the discriminant equation was found to be D = .19o9 xi + x.722 X2 + .0262 X3 + 1.2579 X4.
The use of this equation in our ten pro and nine con search and seizure cases gives
eighteen correct predictions for a success rate of ninety-five per cent even though the
analysis involved only four facts. One assumption would be that the outcome in any
future search-and-seizure case, scored on the same facts and using the weights of the
discriminant equation, could be predicted from the numerical criterion computed
for it 3" It should be noted, however, that we have, for purposes of illustration, used
a simplified example and an experimental model. Emphasis is properly placed,
therefore, not on the specific outcome we have derived, but on the possible potentialities of such an approach for the systematic analysis of judicial materials3 4
Having suggested how a focus on behavioral regularities may assist in the
prediction of court decisions, several evaluative comments may be useful., First, it
should be noted that quantitative techniques are not offered as a replacement for
other useful predictive devices. The point is that such methods may constitute
Since the techniques for analyzing independent variables is considerably simpler than those required for
investigating interdependence, the question is not academic. Kort suggests the Nagel method is
defective in that it assumes independence of the variables. But the assumption has not been shown to
be groundless. It would seem reasonable to assume independence unless such an assumption does not
lead to a separation of pro and con cases.
8
a One federal case involving a search without a warrant has been decided by the Supreme Court
since this was written-Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407 (x963). The discriminant equation
gave a correct prediction of outcome in the case.
", Although it does not seem to have influenced the outcome derived in our over-simplified example,
we have ignored certain theoretical problems concerning small n's and frequency distributions.
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additional tools in the arsenal of analytical techniques available to the lawyer.
Secondly, all predictive statements referred to directly or indirectly in this paper are
to be interpreted in probabilistic terms. This should go without saying. Yet, there
seems to be some confusion as to what is meant by predictive statements in the physical and social sciences. It is recognized in micro-physics that knowledge of the
position and velocity of a body will not enable absolute prediction of the body's location in the next instant. However, probabilistic statements can be made about the
movements of large numbers of particles, and statistical laws governing their behavior can be safely formulated. Likewise, in social science predictive statements
are probabilistic assertions. Llewellyn's recognition of this leads him to suggest
implicitly that the approach of the social scientist is inadequate for the purposes
of the lawyer. For he says:"
The lawyer does not ask: How does an appellate tribunal arrive at a decision, some
decision, any decision-in general, as an approximative pattern, in perhaps three, even
four or seven, cases out of ten? The lawyer asks, instead: How does this appellate
tribunal arrive at the particularand concrete answer which, it reaches in the particular
and concrete case?
I know of no man in the social disciplines who would dare to ask such a question.
But the lawyer wants to know in order that he may apply the knowledge in advance to
a particularconcrete tribunal in the next sPEipFic appeal, with which he will be concerned. In the present state of the other social disciplines or of behavioral science at large
-so far as published work goes-this would be a dream-inquiry. It would be fantastic.
Yet, in the legal profession, Llewellyn asserts, real progress has been made in
intuiting and documenting some very useful leads toward prediction of outcome, case
by case. Llewellyn's discussion of this matter is defective on two counts. While it
is true that predictive statements in social science are probabilistic, they do not differ
in that respect from predictive statements in the physical sciences or in the law.
Secondly, after having seemingly rejected the probabilistic approach, Llewellyn adopts
it in essence almost immediately. For he says that he does not believe in absolute
certainty of outcome. Instead, he sees, 8
... degrees of lessening uncertainty of outcome ranging from what to the observer or

participant seems pure chance, into a situation where a skilled, experienced guess (though
only a guess) is yet a better bet than the guess of the ignorant, through a situation where
the odds run plainly a little one way, through one where skilled counsel can be expected
to materially increase the odds, and on through the situation which is a business gamble
or better into the one which is for human living "safe."
Thus Llewellyn's prediction of outcome in any given case is a probability statement-i.e., the chances are, the odds are, it is a good bet that outcome will go in a
specified direction. Llewellyn's assertions have the same applicability to the "single
case" as the probability statements of a social or behavioral scientist. Moreover, they
are derived in the same fashion, i.e., from a study of certain regularities observed in
" KAR. N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRAmDrrio-DEcvoT1
" Id. at 17.

APP.E.As

15-16 (xg6o).
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the past. The primary difference that might be noted is that between an impressionistic and literary excursion in the materials and a rigorous-systematic analysis.
Finally, the fact that we may be right only eight times in ten is not fatal. Indeed,
were we to predict perfectly all case outcomes in a judicial system, we would probably be saddled with a static system soon to collapse under pressures for change.
That we have not had such a system in the United States may, indeed, explain the
traditional strength of our judicial institutions.
II
RELIABILIT' OF DECISION MAKING PROCESSES

We may now shift our focus from the practical matter of predicting court
decisions to a problem that lies at the core of the judicial process: the dispensation of
justice to those accused of violating the law. In the most narrow sense, those so
accused are entitled to a test of their guilt or innocence by a fair and accurate testing
procedure. If such procedures are subject to error, comparison must be made in
terms of relative reliability. The reliability of a particular instrument might be
expressed as the probability of accurate results when applied to a sufficiently large
number of cases. In industry the instrument might be a test for quality control, in
medicine a diagnosis, and in criminology a lie detector test. But in the courtroom,
we rely upon the jury, as well as the judge, to render correct results.
The way in which we structure a decision-making apparatus will determine, in
part, how well it performs the function assigned it. It is evident, for example,
that the reliability of a jury system in separating the innocent from the guilty depends
upon the total system of criminal adjudication leading to jury action. Skolnick has
87
conceptualized the state as a
... sorting machine, trying to identify those persons in the entire population who are
responsible for acts which the state has designated criminal. Not a single individual, but
a population mass, is continually being processed. In this view, every individual in the
population is tested to see whether it was he who committed a particular act. An
hypothesis is formed by the state regarding each individual, and for most individuals the
hypothesis of guilt is rejected. For some, it is maintained at every level of the criminal
process-arrest, preliminary hearing, grand jury, petit jury. Each level of adjudication
serves to filter out the innocent. Every previous level affects the accuracy of the subtequent level.
This statement says, in effect, that the magnitude of error at any given stage of
adjudication is related to the degree of error in previous stages. This is the notion
of conditional probability. Its importance can be illustrated in tree diagrams involving two basic assumptions. First, it is assumed that the unconditional probability
of accuracy in the jury system is known. The population to be processed is that
which remains after the filtering processes of arrest, hearing, grand jury action, and
, Skolnkk, Sdentific Theory and S qea fx Evidence: An Andyds

694, 719 (1961).

of Lie Deledion, 70 YALE L. J.
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so on. Second, we assume that the unconditional probability of random choices in
the filtered population being guilty or innocent is known.
In the first tree diagram, we assume that the probability of a guilty person in
the filtered population is .995 and the unconditional reliability of the testing instrument (the jury) is ninety-five per cent.
Pr. Poh 1 =.00475

.005

Pr. Poth2 =.00025

.05

Pr. Poth4
4 =.04975

'.05

The diagram clarifies several probability relationships. The conditional probability
of a correct jury verdict of guilty is .94525 as applied to those guilty in the population.0 8 The conditional probability of a finding of guilt for those who are innocent
in the population is .o0025. But approximately fifty of those guilty in our example
of iooo persons would be found innocent.
Pr. Path 1 =.09500

.95

.05

.95

Pr. Path 2 = .00500

Pr. Path 3 = .85500

.900
.05

Pr. Path 4 = .04500

In our second tree diagram, we reduce the number guilty in the filtered population but retain ninety-five per cent accuracy for the testing instrument. The result
shows that approximately forty-five of those guilty would be found innocent and
that the conditional probability that those guilty will be so designated by the jury
system is .85500. This result, when compared to our first example, illustrates the
fact that the greater the proportion of guilty in the population being tested, the more
the system is weighted in favor of the innocent.
Pr. Path J =.07500

.25

Pr. Path 2 = .02500

.100
Pr. Path 3 =.67500

900.75,
5.2-5

Pr. Path 4 = .22500

aeThe conditional probabilities are the products of the probabilities along a particular path.
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In our third tree diagram, we retain the distribution of guilty and innocent in
the population and reduce the reliability of the jury. In this case, it is clear that the
more inaccurate the testing instrument, the greater the system is weighted in favor
of the larger proportion of the filtered population. It is clear, then, that the unconditional accuracy of our testing device must be high. But how do we make it
so? Of the many factors that might be considered, we shall focus on some
numerical aspects of the jury system, namely: the gross size of juries and the
minimal vote required for rendering a verdict.
The question we pose is whether the accuracy of jury verdicts is affected by the
numbers we have chosen as relevant. Does it really matter whether juries decide by
unanimous vote, a bare majority vote, or some vote in between? Does it make any
difference whether the size of a decision making group is

12, 212,

or io,ooo?

We may observe at the outset that in many jurisdictions the answer has been
in the affirmative. But there seems to be little agreement as to the most appropriate
numbers to use or to the reason for making any particular choice. Thus, great
discrepancies among these choices may be observed. Juries are frequently found to
consist of six," eight,40 and twelve41 members. And in some instances, juries of
three,42 four,4 3 five,44 seven,4 5 nine,4" and fourteen47 persons are encountered.
Verdicts may be rendered by unanimous4 s vote, by nine-twelfths, 40 ten-twelfths, 0
two-thirds, 5 ' and various other numerical proportions. In Massachusetts the
defendant may validate a verdict rendered by less than twelve jurors. Several states
allow the parties to stipulate the size of the jury as well as the size of the majority
to be required for a verdict

2

It may be that such variety is a consequence of

arbitrary or random choice. And if the discrepancies make no difference in so far
as validity of judgment is concerned, then we may ignore them or consider the
waste of resources involved. But since traditional wisdom and practice holds that
justice is best dispensed through collegial decision making, we may ask what
theoretical basis can be adduced for such a claim. And we may reasonably require
something other than the plausible cliches that clutter the literature.
One way to construct the kind of theory needed is through the use of a probability
model. As with the construction of any theory, certain assumptions will be required. But this is not an insuperable obstacle in the use of probability theory.
"' Florida and Connecticut. The following references to states are illustrative, not exhaustive.
40 Utah.
"' Alabama.
42 Arizona, Virginia, and Indiana.
"sNevada.

44 Georgia, Delaware, Louisiana, and Virginia.
"Virginia.
"Arizona.
,17Massachusetts, New Jersey.
"Illinois, Massachusetts, Texas.
Kentucky.
Wisconsin.

51 Missouri.
52 Maine,

Louisiana.
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For example, it can be accepted as self-evident that the more information presented
to an individual or a group, the smaller the proportion that can be recalled. Likewise, the larger the number of persons in a group, the greater the probability that
some member of the group can recall a particular item of information. If we know
the probability constant (p) that an individual will remember a particular item and
each individual in a group is assigned the same items, then the probability of at least
one individual in the group remembering the item is I - (I - p)n where n is the
size of the group.5 3 If these were the only considerations, then, of course, the
largest possible jury would be preferred for I - (I - p)" increases as n increases.
The problem here is not quite that simple. Decision making involves more than
recall of relevant information. Justice miscarries for many reasons. Prejudice and
other extraneous causes may sometimes be responsible. But this is not necessarily
the case since men are fallible and subject to error regardless of sincerity or intent.
In spite of the possibility of error, whatever the decision making procedures,
courts of law must reach conclusions, and defendants must sometimes be condemned
for the protection of society. But if the probability of error in the verdict is greater
than the probability that society will be damaged beyond a permissible point by the
release of the accused, then common sense would seem to dictate a different
decision-making procedure. It may be, however, that no decisional system will
eliminate entirely the probability of error. This seems to be the strongest argument
of those who oppose capital punishment. It appears, however, that systems can be
devised which will reduce considerably the amount of error. If too much protection
against error in the verdict is incorporated in the decisional system, the number of
guilty who go free will perhaps be too large; if too litde protection, then the number
of innocent convicted will be too large. The problem is to decide where the line
should be drawn and how to go about this in some systematic fashion.
Several approaches to this problem have been suggested. One of the earliest
writers to concern himself with a possible solution was Condorcet.54 The basic
assumption underlying the work of Condorcet and of those who have followed
him is that the probability of a decision being accurate can be determined in the
same way that one determines the probability of drawing white and black balls
from an urn containing nothing else. A white ball may be analogized to a good
or just or correct decision. Only the misguided decision maker or one with bad
conscience will draw a black ball, or make a wrong decision. Condorcet assumes
that the same urn serves all decision makers, all causes, and all courts in the same
country.
In any judicial system performing the function of dispensing justice, it is necessary to assume that the white balls (the correct decisions) are more numerous in the
urn than the black balls (incorrect decisions). For if otherwise, a judge or jury
making decisions would be expected to err more than half the time. In such case,
"'Sce Hays & Bush, A Study of Group Action, ig Am. Soc. REv. 693 (1954).
"N. C. DE CONDORCET, ESSAI SUR L'APPLICATION DE L'ANALYSE A LA PROBABILITA
RENDuEs I LA PLURIALrrE DES voix (1785).

DES DECISIONS
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it would be necessary to abolish or replace the judicial procedure with one more
consonant with traditional notions of fair play.
In order to maintain confidence in judicial decision making, one must be assured
of correct decisions. This is a simple matter according to Condorcet. Correct
judgment is maximized by enlarging the number of decision makers. If the white
balls outnumber the black balls in the urn containing all possible court decisions,' the
probability of their being drawn more frequently than the black balls increases with
the number of drawings; i.e., with the number of judges or jurors making a judgment in a particular case. As the drawings increase, this probability approaches
unity. Thus, the probability of a decision being correct when made by majority
approaches certitude as the size of the majority is increased. All this is based on
additional assumptions that collegial bodies are composed of decision makers each
having an equal sense of justice and equal information, and that decision makers
work in good faith. At the same time Condorcet recognizes that a particular group
may not be composed of intelligent or well-informed men. Any particular body
may be faced with a number of questions on which the probability of a judgment
being correct is less than one-half. In such cases, the more numerous the body, the
greater the probability of error. Any body in which each member errs more than
one-half the time will then make erroneous decisions. But these are exceptions
rather than the rule. If they become the rule, then the decision making process
becomes an absurdity.
In all these calculations, the probability that a judge will be misled is assumed to
be a constant. Condorcet gives several solutions for this statistic, but none are
-satisfactory, for they involve a determination of the ratio of white to black balls
in the urn.
Laplace, in attacking the same general problem, makes similar and dissimilar
assumptions." Like Condorcet, he assimilates the decision of a judge or jury to a
drawing from an urn. He supposes that on the same cause all have an equal chance
of error. He assumes that that chance will be unknown. Thus, he rejects the
Condorcet hypothesis of an invariable probability of error for each decision maker.
Laplace argues that errors in judicial decision making depend largely on the size
of the decision making body and the split of its vote. In the final analysis, Laplace
thinks that such judgments reduce to the following question:56
has the proof of the offense of the accused the high degree of probability necessary
so that the citizens would have less reason to doubt the error of tribunals, if he is
innocent and condemned, than they would have to fear his new crime and those 6f the
unfortunate ones who would be emboldened by the example of his impunity if he were
guilty and acquitted.
...

If that probability ig w, then the judge or juror who condemns an accused announces in effect that the probability of the offense is at least w. The probability
5 In PirsnE S. LAPLAe.,

FmSSAPiLOSOPHIQUE SUR LES PROBABILI1IS (i8xg).

CALCUL DES PROEBAIUTPS eSp. Ch. 13 (1889).
56 Pimtu S. LAPLACE, Tu OIUE M ALYTnQUE DES PRoAmLrs 133

(x8na).

Also se J. BzRTaAND,
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of a particular decision is an unknown, x. Solution of the unknown will lead to a
statistic expressing the probability of error in the decision of a collegial decision
making body.
For purposes of exposition and clarity, the problem may be approached through
a simple game of heads and tails. If we flip a coin with a head on one side and a
tail on the other and the sides are evenly balanced, the probability of heads for the
first trial is one half. This follows from a basic principle of probability theory,
namely that the probability of a simple event is the ratio of the frequency of that
event to the total frequencies of all possible events in the set. If the frequencies
I
are identical, this rule reduces the probability of error to -where k is the total
k
number of possibilities. The probability of a joint event, HH, is the product of the
probability of the first and the probability of the second, or Pr HH = Pr (H) X Pr
(H). And the probability of Hi, H2, H ... Hn = Pr (H 1 ) X Pr. (H 2) X Pr.
(Ha) .... X Pr (H.). But this assumes that both sides of our coin are evenly balanced. If one side is heavier than the other and we are ignorant as to how much heavier, then if the Head is heavier the probability of H in the first trial is (1/2 + a) and
that of the second (1/2 + a) 2 . If the tail is lighter, then the probability of tails is
(1/2 - a) and that of TT is (i/2 - a) 2 . If we have no way of knowing which is
heavier, then the probability of HH or TT is

(1/2 +a)

+ (1 /2 :2

a)'

or 1/4 + a 2.

By the same reasoning TH or HT = 1/4 - a2. The probability of HT (with H
biased) is 1/4 - a and the probability of HT (with T biased) = 1/4 - a2. HT
(with H biased) is one of two possible cases (ie., H biased or T biased) and thus
according to the basic principle of the probability calculus the probability of HT
1/4-a 2
1/4a
(H biased) is
I/4-a 2 +I/4-a 2 or I/2-2a2
Applying this reasoning to judicial decision-making, we may replace H by M
(a vote in the majority) and T by N (a vote in the minority). Instead of assuming
that the probability of M or N being correct is 1/2, Laplace argues that a majority
vote is more likely correct than a vote cast in dissent. How much more likely is art
unknown value just as it was in the coin. problem. Similarly the probability that a

majority vote is correct can be expressed as (M + a). If we let the term (1/2 + a)
= X, then the probability of MM correct is X 2 and the probability of MMMMM
correct is X5. Thus for a 5-4 decision, i.e., MMMMM/NNNN, the probability of
a correct decision if M is weightier or more likely correct than N is X5 (i - X) 4 .
The probability of MMMMM/NNNN correct if N is more likely correct is (I -X)'
X4 . The probability of either of these outcomes if we do not know the value of X
is the ratio of either outcome to the total possible outcomes, ie., for M correct the
probability is X" I-

X +(I (X)"

X)Q
X)PXq where p is the number of votes in the
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majority and q is the number of dissents. Since X is an unknown for which a specific
empirical value cannot be derived, it is necessary to devise a measure which takes
into consideration the total possible values of X between 1/2 and i. By integral
calculus the probability of a sound judgment relative to all values of X is
fXdx. ( - X)a the integral for the numerator being
taken for all values from
fXPdx. (i - X)1
1/2 to X = i and that of the denominator being taken from X = o to X = x.
In the same manner the probability of error in a judgment may be found if we take
the integral of the numerator from X = o to X = 1/2. This last probability reduces
to

X=

2P + q +'l

TI-

+

).(p+q)

(p +q+

+ (p+q+')
I

1

(1)

2

)

(p+q+i) (p+q) (p+q-i31

(p+q+l) (p+q) (p+q-i) ... (p +2)
i.2-3 ....q

This may be simplified somewhat when p - q is large by
Nn+ 1 VN

[_ i-N

(V2) npPqq V7 p q (p - q)

or (3) P = 1/2 - f (s),where S2 -

(p -- q)'

-N'-13pq
12pqn

(p - q)N
4pq

s is a standard score and f (s) is the area of the normal curve, when p - q is small.
If this is applied to the Athenian dicast which convicted Socrates, we find that
a body of 5oi members voted 281 to 220 for conviction. The probability of error
given by the Laplace formula for that decision is .003. As applied to the federal
jury system, the probability of error in a unanimous (12 vote) decision is .00012.
For any unanimous vote the probability is 1/ 2?+1. For a twelve man body making
decisions by various sized majorities, the probabilities of error are as follows:
(by formula i)
Vote

Probabilityof error

I-I

.00171

10-2

.01123

9-3
8-4
7-5
6-6

.04614

.13342
-29053
.5o0o0
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For a six man jury the probabilities are:
5-I

.o6248

4-2

.aa649

3-3

.50000

For a nine man jury the probabilities, when computed by formula (i) are:
8-i

.oo67

7-2

.05432

6-3

.17072

5-4

.37442

Inspection of the three sets of probabilities shows that the probability of error
decreases with an increase in the size of the majority if the size of the decisionmaking group is held constant. Likewise, if the difference between the number of
majority and dissenting votes is held constant, the probability of error increases with
an increase in the size of the body. And if the ratio of dissenting to majority votes
remains unchanged, the probability of error becomes less as the size of the group is
enlarged.
A choice of the appropriate group size and the majority to be required for decision could be made in terms of the probability of error considered permissible. As
for traditional practice, the requirement of a unanimous verdict is consonant with
-a desire to reduce error to a minimum-a desire that is basic to the assumption of
innocence which we apply to those accused of law violations. The choice of a twelve
man jury, however, cannot be justified on the same grounds since, with a unanimous
verdict, the probability of error decreases with an increase in jury size. But the twelve
man jury is more compatible with a strong desire to protect the innocent than any
number less than twelve so long as the unanimity rule prevails.
Finally it must be kept in mind that this probability model is constructed on the
basis of certain assumptions which may or may not be acceptable. The validity of
the hypotheses it provides, in so far as the real world is concerned, depends upon
the validity of the assumptions in the model when applied to real life. If the
theory in fact describes an empirical system, an affirmation of the hypotheses derived
would be expected when subjected to empirical testing. And since probability
models can be just as easily developed in terms of different assumptions, a rejection
of the assumptions in the Laplace model does not destroy the usefulness of such an
approach.
CONCLUSION

Here, as in our remarks on behavioral regularities and prediction, emphasis is
properly placed on the potentialities of such theories and techniques rather than
on specific outcomes. For much, if not all, work of this nature is still in the
experimental stage. If students of the judicial processes, in sufficient numbers,
shift their focus to behavioral regularities and the possibilities of using quantitative
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techniques for analysis, then theories and predictive devices far superior to anything suggested here may be discovered. But were scientific development to cease
at this point in time, the legal profession would be open to the charge that it is not
making sufficient use of the available tools which modern science offers, from
simple statistical and probability concepts to advanced computer techniques. While
none of this is likely to lead to "law machines that give automatic answers"5' 7 to
questions put to them, scientific methods can improve significantly the analytical
powers of those who use them.
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